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PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS UNDER NEBRASKA'S
NEW DIVORCE LAWS
Roger C. Henderson*
Change inevitably leaves in its wake a certain amount of disrup-
tion and uncertainty, and this certainly is no less true where entire
statutory schemes are replaced with new codifications. Thus it is
that lawyers and judges concerned with dissolution of marriages in
Nebraska will experience some discomfort at being uprooted from
the old and familiar in dealing with this area of family relations.
Once the initial reaction has passed, however, it will be seen that
the new law,1 effective July 6, 1972, for the most part changes only
the law in the books and leaves the law in practice relatively unmo-
lested. The purpose of L.B. 820, the new divorce act, is to make
the law more nearly conform to that in practice and to simplify
and remove the antiquated provisions dealing with annulments,
separations and divorce, many of which were initially passed be-
fore the turn of this century. While time will judge whether this
objective has been achieved, the practicing lawyer and judge must
prepare now to implement the new law as it exists. It is hoped
that this article will facilitate and aid in that task as it attempts to
outline the practice and point out some of the problems ahead.
I. JURISDICTION
The power of the state to dissolve marriages has never really
been challenged in this country since Maynard v. Hill2 was decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1888. The federal courts
having eschewed any responsibility for jurisdiction over divorces,3
* B.B.A., 1960, University of Texas; LL.B., 1965, University of Texas;
LL.M., 1969, Harvard University. Member of the Texas and Ameri-
can Bar Associations. Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. L.B. 820, 2d Sess., 82d Neb. Leg. (1972) (codified as NEB. REv. STAT.§§ 42-347 to 379 (Cum. Supp. 1972) ). This bill was introduced by
Senators Waldron and Carpenter. In adopting one of the so called
no-fault tests as grounds for divorce (irretrievable breakdown, irre-
concilable differences, or insupportability), Nebraska joins Alabama,
California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Texas. See Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the
American Jurisdictions, 6 F.PmLy L.Q. 179 (1972).
2. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
3. "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony,
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the question arises as to when a particular state can exercise this
power. The law has long recognized the importance of the family
unit in our society and it is obvious that the power of a state to
dissolve marriages greatly affects the stability of that unit, which
in turn affects our society. There are two basic problems in the
area of state jurisdiction over divorces. The first problem con-
cerns the minimum contacts or interests that a state must have, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, in relation to a party or par-
ties to a marriage when a dissolution of that marriage is sought.
The second problem concerns the maximum restrictions which a
state can impose upon a party or parties seeking a divorce in its
forums. In the celebrated case of Williams v. North Carolina,4 it
was decided that domicile of one of the parties to the marriage
would suffice to give the domiciliary state jurisdiction to grant a
divorce, but the Supreme Court of the United States has never de-
cided what absolute minimum contacts or interests must exist be-
tween a state and a party or parties to a marriage before that state
has the power to dissolve the marriage relationship. 5
either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to
divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board." Barber v. Barber,
62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859). Although this statement has been criticized
as dicta, the Supreme Court has been steadfast in refusing to recog-
nize jurisdiction over domestic relations. See Ohio ex rel. Popovici
v. Alger, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
4. 317 U.S. 287 (1942). "For it seems clear that the provision of the
Nevada statute that a plaintiff in this type of case must 'reside' in
the State for the required period requires him to have a domicil, as
distinguished from a mere residence, in the state. Latterner v. Lat-
terner, 51 Nev. 285, 274 P. 194; Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d
872. Hence the decrees in this case, like other divorce decrees, are
more than in personam judgments. They involve the marital status
of the parties. Domicil creates a relationship to the state which is
adequate for numerous exercises of state power. See Lawrence v.
State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 279; New York ex tel. Cohn v.
Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-464;
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69. Each state as a sovereign has a
rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domi-
ciled within its borders. The marriage relation creates problems
of large social importance. Protection of offspring, property interests,
and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of
commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with which
the state must deal. Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of .its
command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution
of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of
the spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent."
317 U.S. at 298-99.
5. In Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1953), the issue involved
the jurisdictional power of the Virgin Islands to grant divorces.
Judge Goodrich, speaking for the majority, held that the power is
based on domicile and that the statute which authorized divorces on
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Nebraska now provides for two separate bases of jurisdiction.
The first requires domicile in Nebraska of one of the parties for one
year prior to the filing of a petition for divorce. The second re-
quires that the marriage be solemnized in Nebraska and that one
of the parties reside in Nebraska from the time of the marriage to
the filing of the petition. If the family unit is of paramount im-
portance in our society, it follows that the state that has the great-
est interest in the stability of that unit be vested with the power
to alter or dissolve it. Under Williams it is clear that domicile is a
constitutionally sound basis, as this requirement is apt to vest the
power in the state or states most affected. Nebraska's first basis
which requires domicile adheres to this proposition insofar as the
minimulm test is concerned. Nebraska's second basis, however, de-
viates from the domicile requirement in that it requires something
less, namely celebration and continued residence in Nebraska. The
fact that the marriage is celebrated in Nebraska does not in itself
enhance the state's interest in the family unit, but where one or
both of the parties to the marriage remain in Nebraska after the
celebration, an exception to the domicile requirement might be war-
ranted in some cases. Nebraska could well be the state with the
most substantial interest in this family unit even though the party
or parties have not established domicile in Nebraska. A serious
drawback to the second basis, however, is the fact that it will also
include persons in whom Nebraska has no interest. For example,
two people from Iowa could come to Nebraska, marry in a relatively
short time, and have grounds for divorce arise immediately before
the couple leaves the state. Thus, it would seem that this second
basis should be tightened up so that only those persons in whom
Nebraska has a substantial interest will qualify for divorce in this
state.7 This could be done by adding a third element to the second
the basis of personal service within the jurisdiction or upon a general
appearance of the parties was unconstitutional. Writ of certiorari was
granted, but the case became moot before the Supreme Court decided
the issue when the husband obtained a divorce in his home state of
Connecticut. The issue was again raised in 1955, but the Supreme
Court disposed of the case on another ground. Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-349 (Cun Supp. 1972). Special provision is
also made in this section for persons serving in the armed forces of
the United States.
For a discussion of Stuckey v. Stuckey, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d
656 (1971), where three of the seven justices on the Nebraska Su-
preme Court held that in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in a divorce case is authorized on a minimum contacts the-
ory under Nebraska's long-arm statute, see 51 NEB. L. REV. 159
(1971).
7. To the extent Nebraska affords divorce jurisdiction to dissolve mar-
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basis in the form of a requirement of an intent that Nebraska be the
permanent place of residence. In this way, the example of the two
people from another state mentioned above would be eliminated
unless one of the parties intended to make Nebraska his or her
permanent place of residence. It would seem that Nebraska has
little interest in providing a forum for divorce for persons who
marry in this state and merely remain in the state until such time
as a cause of action for divorce arises and the petition is filed
without any intention of permanent residence.
Recent United States Supreme Court cases dealing with dura-
tional residence requirements in regard to qualifications for wel-
fare benefits and voting foretell problems with some state laws in
regard to the maximum restrictions a state may impose upon par-
ties seeking divorce. In Shapiro v. Thompsons the United States
Supreme Court held that a state may not penalize the exercise of
the fundamental right of a person to travel interstate unless it is
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est. A one year waiting period to qualify for welfare benefits was
struck down because the state could not justify this barrier to in-
terstate travel. This reasoning was followed in Dunn v. Blumstein9
which invalidated certain durational residence requirements in re-
gard to voter qualifications. From these cases the message is clear
that long durational residence requirements which impinge upon
fundamental rights are constitutionally suspect, and that the in-
volved state will have a heavy burden to shoulder in justifying pe-
riods beyond a few months.
As more and more states adopt the "no fault" grounds for di-
vorce, the problem of people traveling from one state to another
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce will diminish. 10 In the era
of migratory divorces, states with relatively liberal grounds for di-
vorce were legitimately concerned with preventing their forums
riages in which it has little or no interest, it will almost inevitably
undercut a state having such interest. One exception is the case
where the parties have no present intent to make any state their
permanent place of abode. The number of such cases outside the
military are probably relatively small and it probably can be safely
assumed that this domicile-less status is not long in duration in
most of these cases.
8. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
9. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
10. The so-called migratory divorce problem resulted from the disparity
in grounds for divorce existing among various states. The classic
case involved residents of New York, where the only effective ground
for divorce was adultery, traveling to another state such as Nevada,
where cruelty was recognized as a grounds and where one could es-
tablish residence in a relatively short time.
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from becoming divorce havens for persons who actually resided
elsewhere. Many states enacted durational residence requirements.
That is, in addition to becoming a bona fide resident or domiciliary,
a person had to maintain this status in the state for a certain period,
sometimes up to two years. Nebraska now requires that a per-
son be a bona fide resident of the state for one year prior to the
filing of the petition.1 1 Although this requirement of one year is
not as suspect as those states which have longer requirements, it is
worth considering the effect of the Shapiro and Dunn cases on this
type of residence requirement.
There are many people in the United States, within and without
the military, who move or are subject to being moved by their
employers or for other reasons on a regular or frequent basis.
Most states provide exceptions for the military in their divorce ju-
risdiction statutes to take into account the problem that a person
can be stationed in a state for a long period of time and yet never
acquire domicile there. These provisions typically allow a person
in the armed forces to qualify under the divorce laws if he or she
has been continuously stationed at any military base or installation
in the state for whatever residence period is otherwise required.
This has been a partial solution for some, but it leaves untouched
the other problem which concerns people who voluntarily move or
who are forced to move from one jurisdiction to another. Un-
doubtedly many of these people are not able to qualify for expedi-
tious relief in the area of divorce because of the durational part of
the residence requirements of state laws where those laws require
a substantial period of residence. As states become more uniform
in their divorce grounds, the people who are caught by long dura-
tional residence requirements are increasingly going to be people
who are traveling from state to state for reasons other than di-
vorce. To the extent that this happens, the requirement will be-
come increasingly hard to justify. The right to obtain a divorce
can in some cases be as fundamental as the right to travel or to
vote. Health, safety or financial circumstances may dictate that
temporary relief under divorce or dissolution of the marriage laws
be had as soon as possible. In addition, if a marriage is no longer
viable, one should be allowed to discontinue that relationship, seek
out another, and thereby establish a stable family unit, which has
long been recognized as a fundamental right12 and of paramount
importance to our society.13
11. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-349 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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The relevance of the reasoning in Shapiro and Dunn should be
clear here. Even if the right to obtain a divorce is not thought to
be as fundamental as the right to vote in general, the inability to
obtain temporary relief or a divorce in the forum of a newly ac-
quired residence within a reasonable period of time certainly im-
pinges on and penalizes the exercise of the right to travel. Unless
a state can show that its durational residence requirement is neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest, and that will
be harder to accomplish as uniformity of grounds for divorce
among the states increases, one should expect the Supreme Court
of the United States to eventually hold that long durational resi-
dence requirements, such as one year or more, do not pass consti-
tutional muster.14
Nebraska continues to recognize legal separations or divorces
from bed and board under its new law. 15 When the new divorce
act was introduced in the legislature, section 4 of the bill (section
42-350 as codified) contained the jurisdictional basis pertaining to
legal separation, but during the legislative process the provision
was deleted.' Legal separation is defined in such a way that it is
clearly excluded from being considered as an action for dissolution,
and it is unlikely that a court could, with any degree of logic, say
that the jurisdictional requirements for dissolution also pertain to
an action for legal separation. In any event, the new law is silent
on the subject of jurisdictional bases for actions for legal separa-
tion and it would behoove the legislature to reinsert the original
provision with one minor change,' 7 so as to make it conform to the
14. In Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 P.2d 939 (Hawaii 1972), the Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that its one year residency requirement as a
prerequisite to obtaining an absolute divorce in the state is valid, re-
versing the lower court which held that the requirement violated the
"equal protection clause" of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution.
15. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-347 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
16. Prior to the amendment deleting the jurisdictional basis shown in
italics the section, in its entirety, read:
Sec. 4. An action for legal separation may be brought by any
person who has actual residence in the county in which the petition
is filed. If a petition for legal separation is filed before residence
requirements for dissolution of marriage have been complied with,
either party, upon complying with such requirements, may amend his
pleadings to request a dissolution of marriage, and notice of such
amendment shall be given in the same manner as for an original ac-
tion under this act.
As enacted, the section makes little sense because no jurisdictional
basis exists in the act for filing an action for legal separation.
17. The reinserted sentence should read: "An action for legal separa-
tion may be brought by any person who is a bona fide resident of
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jurisdictional basis language in section 42-349 dealing with actions
for dissolution. s
Finally, the new divorce act provides that actions for annul-
ments "shall be subject to all applicable provisions of sections 42-347
to 42-379 pertaining to dissolutions of marriage, except that the only
residence requirement shall be that petitioner be an actual resident
of the county in which the petition is filed."'19 Since annulments are
for the purpose of declaring that a valid marriage never existed,
there is no reason to have a durational requirement as in the case of
divorce. Annulments can only be granted under rather strict statu-
tory grounds which usually evidence the policy of the state to pro-
hibit or discourage certain unions.20  If one or more of these
grounds are met, mere domicile should suffice as authority for the
state to declare the marriage invalid. It would be incongruous for
the state to provide that a void or voidable marriage could not be
the subject of an annulment action until a certain period of time
had elapsed. The possibility of fraud upon Nebraska courts and
the undercutting of the interests of other states is rather remote
in actions for annulments.2 ' Thus, there is no reason why prompt
relief should not be available to citizens of Nebraska in this area.
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process has not been altered significantly from that
this state .h- I - = d== ;- th= =...-- ;- 4U- rc-^'-
; "" Without the italicized language an ambiguity exists in
§ 42-350 when compared with § 42-349 because the language "actual
residence" could be construed to mean something less than the domi-
cile language used in § 42-350. The stricken language is surplusage
since § 42-348 covers venue in all proceedings under the new divorce
act.
18. Out of an abundance of caution, it should be pointed out that there
should be no durational residence requirement for actions for legal
separations. Prompt official recognition of the separation should be
available so that the parties can seek protective orders in regard to
their marital rights and obligations during what often times is the
most trying period of marital discord.
19. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-373 (Cum. Supp. 1972). This language is also
susceptible to the same ambiguity discussed previously, note 17 supra,
and should be changed to read: ". . . except that the only residence
requirement shall be that petitioner be a bona fide resident of this
state a= =t'_ lr-_idan-t - -h =-t-- h 1 ticn;-fld
20. The annulment grounds in Nebraska are set out in NEB. Ruv. STAT.
§ 42-374 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
21. The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is judged by the
law of the jurisdiction where it is celebrated and this is recognized
by statute in Nebraska. NEB. RIv. STAT. § 42-117 (Reissue 1968).
Contrast this with the choice of law rule in dissolution of marriages.
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under former sections 42-305 and 42-305.01.22 Section 42-355, deal-
ing with service, merely combines and simplifies the two former
sections dealing with service. The only substantive change
wrought was in the provision of notice by publication. Heretofore,
one was required to make "reasonable and due inquiry and search"
as to the whereabouts of the defendant for three months after filing
the petition before the court could authorize notice by publication
when the defendant's whereabouts was unknown. This period is
now reduced to thirty days.
At this point it might be worthwhile to review some basic law
pertaining to service of process and the effect of obtaining differ-
ent types of jurisdiction through that service. Since 1948 the Su-
preme Court of the United States has recognized what are com-
monly called "divisible divorces." In Estin v. Estin23 and Vander-
hilt v. Vanderbilt24 it was held that in rem jurisdiction will suffice
to authorize a state to dissolve the marriage relationship. In rem
jurisdiction, however, will not suffice to terminate a spouse's or
children's rights to support, or otherwise affect property rights.2 5
Section 42-355 provides four methods of service of process. Sub-
section 1 provides for personal service within Nebraska; subsection
2 provides for personal service outside of Nebraska; and subsection
4 authorizes dissolution of a marriage, or a legal separation, where
the respondent personally appears in the case. Service perfected
under subsection 1, personal appearance under subsection 4, and
service upon a resident of Nebraska under subsection 2 will suffice
to give in personam jurisdiction over the defendant so that rights
and obligations in regard to support and property may be af-
fected 26 in addition to the dissolution of the marriage. In other
words, the court having jurisdiction by virtue of any one of these
types of service is empowered to enter an order requiring the de-
fendant to pay alimony or child support, and this decree will not
only be enforceable in the decreeing state, but will also be enforce-
able in every state of the United States.2 7 Out-of-state personal
The law of the forum where the dissolution is sought governs re-
gardless of when and where the underlying conduct took place.
22. These sections were repealed by L.B. 820 § 35, 2d Sess., 82d Neb.
Leg. (1972).
23. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
24. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
25. If the court has perfected in rem jurisdiction over property of the
spouses located within the state, it has power to affect it. See Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 715 (1877).
26. See CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS § 11.4 (1968).
27. This would be true under the "full faith and credit clause" found in
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, and in addi-
tion could be achieved in most states under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act.
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service upon a nonresident of Nebraska and citation by publica-
tion, however, suffice only to give in rem jurisdiction, and a court
does not have the power to enter an order for support which other
states are compelled to enforce under this type of service, 28 except
to the extent that the court has in rem jurisdiction over the prop-
erty of a party.29 As previously stated though, in rem jurisdiction
does suffice to dissolve the marriage.
II. WAITING PERIOD
Concern over hasty divorces has caused most states to provide
for a "cooling off period" either prior or subsequent to the divorce
hearing. Some states have provided for both, as did Nebraska un-
der former section 42-305.02, where a suit for divorce could not be
heard or tried until sixty days after the filing of the plaintiff's
petition, and under former section 42-340 where a decree of di-
vorce did not become final or operative until six months after trial,
except for the purpose of appeal. Under the new act Nebraska
kept the latter provision,3" but increased the sixty-day waiting
period prior to hearing or trial to six months.31 This period may
be waived, however, where the court determines that conciliation
efforts have failed. Nebraska is unique in having such a long wait-
ing period prior to the divorce hearing, and particularly so when
it is coupled with a six-month interlocutory period after the hear-
ing before the divorce becomes final.
32
At first glance one is tempted to argue that the legislature
should eliminate the six-month waiting period prior to the hear-
ing, and return to the sixty-day waiting period under the old law.
One should, however, not be so quick to return to the familiar.
It is suggested that a better solution would be to eliminate the six-
month interlocutory period following the hearing or trial because
this type of provision has caused serious problems. Two main
28. See CLARK, LAw OF DorvissTic RELATIONS § 11.2 (1968).
29. Note 25, supra.
30. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-372 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
31. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 42-363 (Cum. Supp. 1972). The section also re-
quires the six months to run from service, appearance, or completion
of conciliation proceedings instead of from filing as under the old
law.
32. Vermont appears to be the only other state requiring a six-month
waiting period, this running from the date of service, but it is limited
to cases involving child custody. VER. R.C.P. 80(h) (1971). Other
states rely on their general rules or codes of civil procedure pertain-
ing to the period of time allowed for initial responsive pleading or
require a special waiting period, either from filing or from service,
ranging up to 90 days.
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problems occur when a state has such an interlocutory period.
First, many people do not understand that they are not finally di-
vorced, and proceed to remarry or take other action which is incon-
sistent with their existing marital relation.38 This results in a
void second marriage which compounds their problems. Secondly,
upon the death of one of the spouses during this period, the sur-
viving spouse will inherit or take a statutory forced share,34 which
is the last thing that the deceased spouse usually would want. In
addition, there is little chance of reconciliation after the dirty linen
has been aired in public. Therefore, it would seem preferable to
delete the interlocutory period following the hearing, and have the
divorce become final, subject to appeal, as do other civil judgments
or decrees. This would place Nebraska in line with the majority
of jurisdictions in this country. 5
If the suggested action is taken, then the six-month waiting pe-
riod preceding the hearing would provide a more opportune period
for conciliation and would help assure that only those marriages
which are in fact irretrievably broken are dissolved. If the parties
can show to the court that conciliation efforts have failed, then
the court should have the power to waive the six-month period,
but only upon an additional finding that such waiver is for the
best interest of the parties, including any minor children. In this
connection, it should also be provided that in no event shall the
suit be heard until sixty days after service of process has been
perfected or an appearance entered.3 6 This approach would pro-
vide a minimum "cooling off period" of sixty days which could not
be waived by the court. The six-month period would be the period
normally invoked for purposes of allowing a reasonable time for
conciliation to be effected, but if the parties could show to the satis-
faction of the court that conciliation efforts had failed, that there
was no reasonable expectation that they would succeed, and that
it was for the best interests of all concerned, the court could then
waive the six-month period. The case would not be ripe for hear-
ing, however, unless and until the sixty-day period had elapsed.
33. See, e.g., Loringer v. Kaplan, 179 Neb. 215, 137 NoW.2d 716 (1965).
34. See, e.g., In re Wailer's Estate, 116 Neb. 352, 217 N.W. 588 (1928).
35. See CLARK, LAW OF DorivsTic RELATIoxs § 13.8 (1968).
36. The proposed section would take the place of § 42-363 and read:
"An action for dissolution of marriage may not be heard before six
months shall have elapsed after filing of the petition for dissolution,
but the court may waive this waiting period if it shall determine
that conciliation is highly improbable and that the best interests of the
parties, including any minor children, requires such a waiver. In no
event shall an action for dissolution of a marriage be heard or tried
until sixty days after service of process is perfected or an appearance
is entered."
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IV. TEMPORARY RELIEF PENDING FINAL HEARING
Two types of temporary relief are provided for under the new
act.87 After a petition for dissolution of marriage or legal separa-
tion is filed, and anytime during the pendency of the action, the
court, where immediate relief is necessary, may enter certain tem-
porary orders without notice to the other party.38 The court may
enter orders to protect the assets of the parties, both real and per-
sonal, from being fraudulently conveyed or otherwise dissipated
upon application by either party. The court also may enter orders
protecting the parties from harassment and dealing with the tem-
porary custody of any minor children of the marriage. These types
of ex parte orders expire at the end of ten days or at the time of a
hearing thereon, whichever is earlier.39 The ex parte orders may
be extended into temporary injunctions after notice and hearing,
and can be made permanent upon final hearing.40
The second type of temporary relief authorizes the court to en-
ter orders requiring either party to pay for the temporary support
and maintenance of the other party and minor children, and to en-
able such party to prosecute or defend the action.41 The court
may, where claim is made for temporary allowances, enter an order
granting the allowances after the service of process or after an ap-
pearance is entered, but such orders can only be entered after three
days have elapsed from the time that notice of hearing has been
served or waived. Under a literal reading of this provision, the
court is allowed to enter the order after notice of hearing, but
prior to the hearing itself. The statute does not specify any time
limit within which the hearing has to be held. Justice would seem
to require that, unless there is dire financial need, a court not re-
quire payment prior to the hearing. At the hearing the court
should take evidence on the necessity of payments, and if any is
necessary, the reasonableness of the amount. In the event payment
is required before the hearing is held, the court should entertain
37. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-357 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
38. Although § 42-357 specially authorizes the granting of temporary re-
straining orders, the Nebraska Code of Procedure provides further
conditions which must be met. § 25-1063 details the circumstances
upon which a temporary order should issue, and § 25-1064(2) re-
quires both an affidavit in support of the motion for a temporary or-
der and notice to the party against whom the order is issued.
39. The point from which the 10 days begins to run is not identified in
§ 42-357, but when the latter is considered in conjunction with
§ 25-1070 it would appear that the 10 days should run from time of
notice to the enjoined party. Basic due process would seem to re-
quire that the order will be effective only from the time of notice.
40. NEB. REsv. STAT. § 42-351 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
41. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-357 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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promptly a motion to either move up the hearing date or suspend
the order until the hearing is held.
The new act contains a new provision giving the court the power
to appoint an attorney to protect the interests of any minor children
of the parties.4 2 Presumably this may be done upon the court's own
motion in any action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation,
but the provision will probably be exercised only where custody is
at issue. This commendable provision is sorely needed in many
cases involving child custody.48 Appointed counsel has the power
under the statute to make an independent investigation, to subpoena
witnesses to appear and testify on matters pertinent to the welfare
of the children, and to receive a fee, which can include expenses to
be fixed by the court. The amount is to be taxed as costs and paid
by the parties as ordered by the court. If the party responsible for
paying is indigent, the fee is to be paid by the county if the court
so orders.
Ex parte orders, as necessary as they are, can be the sub-
ject of abuse by the parties. One of the areas of abuse has
been in regard to excluding a reluctant party from the family
dwelling. It is not infrequent that a marriage has reached the
point that it is no longer viable, but neither of the parties will
move out of the family dwelling. In the past one of the techniques
for removing a party was for an action of divorce to be filed with
supporting affidavits requesting a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the other spouse "from going about or upon the prem-
ises, or in the home of the petitioner or the person of the peti-
tioner, and from accosting, molesting, communicating or causing
any harm to petitioner and from interfering with petitioner in
her custody, control, and management of any children," or similar
language. Sometimes the alleged facts supporting the request for
the temporary restraining order were more apparent than real,
but nevertheless, the court would rather be safe than sorry. The
restraining order was then served upon the other spouse, usually
the husband, while he was away from the home and he was ef-
fectively evicted. In some instances he had to get a deputy sheriff
to accompany him home just to get his personal belongings. In
any event, this practice will be curtailed under section 42-357 be-
cause a special provision has been inserted dealing with this prob-
lem. The court may order either party excluded from the family
dwelling of the other only upon a showing that physical or emo-
tional harm would otherwise result, and this is after motion, notice
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-358 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
43. See Nemecek v. Nemecek, 188 Neb. 799, 199 N.W.2d 409 (1972), and
in particular the dissenting opinion of Smith, J.
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and hearing. Ex parte relief excluding a spouse is unavailable.
This is a commendable provision because it helps to solve a thorny
problem where the parties will not voluntarily decide who shall
remain in the family dwelling until the property is disposed of
upon final hearing. Sometimes the animosity which develops as a
result of being initially excluded from the family dwelling without
opportunity to tell the other side of the story is acute, and in
some cases has even resulted in violence. Since a prompt hearing
upon this type of matter should be available, it would appear that
little or no inconvenience will result. Even where there is some
inconvenience, it is far better to have the court decide who should
remain in the family dwelling, a very emotional issue in some
cases, rather than the parties initially deciding it through ex parte
proceedings.
V. HEARING ON THE GROUND FOR DISSOLUTION
OR SEPARATION
The new divorce act requires that the court hold a public hear-
ing wherein it is incumbent for the party or parties to present
evidence as to whether the marriage should be dissolved or wheth-
er a separation should be authorized. 4  The requirement for cor-
roboration under the old law has been eliminated.45 Thus, if nec-
essary, it is possible for the court to make its determination solely
on the basis of the testimony of the petitioning party.46 The stat-
ute also provides that, in the discretion of the court, a closed hear-
ing may be obtained and that the court can restrict the availability
of the evidence or bill of exceptions. Since public hearings are
crucial to our system of government and jurisprudence, it should
be expected that a court will exercise this discretion guardedly.
Lastly, it should be noted that a divorce or legal separation is not
granted to anyone. The marriage is simply dissolved or the separa-
tion decreed.
Upon a petition for dissolution of marriage the statute expressly
requires that the court make a finding of whether the marriage is
44. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-356 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-335 (Reissue 1968), repealed by L.B. 820 § 35,
2nd Sess., 82nd Neb. Leg. (1972).
46. Since Nebraska's new divorce law is patterned after California's, of
interest should be the recent California Supreme Court decision hold-
ing that in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage the trial court
must require the petitioner to appear personally and testify at the
hearing unless, in exceptional circumstances where an explanation
of the petitioner's absence is shown to the satisfaction of the court,
the court in its sound discretion permits the requisite proof to be
made by affidavit. McKim v. McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 493 P.2d 868,
100 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1972).
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irretrievably broken,47 and implicit in this is the requirement that
the finding be based upon sufficient evidence. Although the stat-
ute does not expressly provide the grounds for a legal separation,
it is implicit that the same finding required for dissolution be
made in this type of case. The new divorce act also requires that
no decree shall be entered unless the court finds that every rea-
sonable effort to effect reconciliation has been made.48  This is set
out as an independent finding from that of irretrievable break-
down. The finding in regard to irretrievable breakdown subsumes
the fact that reconciliation is not possible, but the statute requires
a separate finding that the parties made every reasonable effort to
effect reconciliation.
Now that Nebraska has only one ground upon which a court
may determine that a marriage should be dissolved or that a legal
separation should ensue, it becomes very important to consider
how a court should proceed in determining the existence of that
ground so that the law is applied evenly from court to court and
from case to case. Other jurisdictions have had some experience
with a similar standard involving incompatibility of tempera-
ment.49 While cases construing "incompatibility of temperament"
are instructive, ° perhaps one should start afresh with the term
"irretrievably broken." The term, by its nature, calls upon the
court to formulate a standard which can neither be completely
objective nor subjective. A completely objective standard is un-
workable because here we are dealing with a standard which will
vary from individual to individual, while a completely subjective
standard would leave the court to the mercy of the party or par-
ties and, except for the issue of credibility, would result in a rub-
ber stamp operation. Perhaps the closest analogy one can call up
is that of the standard of negligence for an adolescent child. There
we take into consideration as part of the facts and circumstances of
our mythical ordinary prudent person the individual characteris-
tics of the child. We determine whether the child in question ex-
ercised the type of prudence that would be expected of an ordinary
47. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-347(1) and 42-361 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
48. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-360 (Cum. Supp. 1972). Although the statute
clearly covers all decrees, the wisdom of making this requirement ap-
ply to a decree for legal separation is questionable.
49. The following jurisdictions have adopted incompatibility of tempera-
ment as a grounds for divorce: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Kansas,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and the Virgin Islands. Freed, supra
note 1.
50. See, e.g., Shearer v. Shearer, 356 F.2d 391 (3rd Cir. 1965). For further
cases on what amounts to incompatibility or inability to live together,
see Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1958).
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child of the same age and experience under the .same circum-
stances. A similar approach would seem to be appropriate for the
court in determining whether or not the marriage is "irretrievably
broken." The court would take into consideration the personal
characteristics of the party or parties seeking dissolution or sepa-
ration, and formulate a standard on that basis. The court would
then substitute this "ordinary" person in the place of the party in
question and ask whether or not the conduct or circumstances in-
volving the actual parties would result in an irretrievably broken
marriage between the mythical parties. In many cases the answer
will be quite clear, for the conduct will entail such things as
adultery, cruelty or abuse, desertion, neglect, mental illness,51 or
other conduct which will leave little or no doubt that the mar-
riage is in fact irretrievably broken. The cases on the fringe will
be troublesome, but the court in applying the standard it has for-
mulated should not be any more burdened than it is in many other
cases where the ultimate facts are difficult to determine. It should
be remembered in this regard that the burden of proof is still on the
party seeking the dissolution or separation, and unless that burden
is met the court is justified in refusing the requested relief, just as
in any other case. One can conjure up many cases, such as one
where a party testifies that the marriage is no longer viable be-
cause they do not love each other any longer, or because they have
nothing in common, or because the respondent smokes cigars in
bed while reading into the wee hours of the morning. Certainly in
some cases, any of these could well be a basis upon which a court
could accurately find that the marriage is irretrievably broken.
So much will depend upon the individual parties that one cannot
lay down a standard for all cases, and this is the reason for for-
mulating a standard on the basis of the individual characteristics
of the parties and then applying it to the facts at hand. This is
the reason for treating children differently under negligence law.
When one thinks of the test of extreme cruelty applied under the
prior divorce law, is the new test any more difficult to apply? In
time a body of case law will develop, and until then the task is
probably no more difficult than a "close" cruelty case.
If the legislature were to adopt the suggested revision in re-
gard to the waivable six-month period with an absolute minimum
sixty-day waiting period prior to hearing,52 courts would probably
feel much more secure in finding that a marriage is irretrievably
51. Special provision is made where a spouse is mentally ill at the time
of dissolution of marriage. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-362 (Cum. Supp.
1972).
52. See note 36, supra, and accompanying text.
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broken, particularly where the parties have to show that during
this period they exhausted all reasonable efforts at reconciliation.53
In fact, this six-month requirement would make Nebraska's di-
vorce ground closely akin to the ground many states have had for
some years where they recognize that living separately and apart
for a prescribed period of time is a sufficient basis for divorce.5 4
If the parties have exhausted every reasonable effort at reconcilia-
tion, and one of the parties still insists on a divorce at the end of
a six-month period, there is less chance that a divorce will be
granted where it is not truly justified. The problem has always
been, and will continue to be, that by refusing to grant the divorce
one does not reconcile the parties, but relegates them to lives that
none of us would wish to have imposed on ourselves. The old say-
ing, "you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink"
was never more true than in this area. If the evidence shows that
the disharmony of the spouses in their common life is so deep and
intense as to be irremediable, then it serves no purpose, except
possibly punishment, for the state to refuse to dissolve that union.
You do not establish a stable family unit by refusing the divorce.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the defenses of condona-
tion, connivance and recrimination have no relevance under a test
of "irretrievably broken." The question at this point is one of
whether the marriage is irretrievably broken, and not one of why
it is irretrievably broken. Where, however, the parties collude or
fabricate the evidence, certainly the court should refuse to grant
the relief requested, as in any other case where the parties at-
tempt to work a fraud upon the court.
VI. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
The law in regard to custody and support of minor children
remains substantially the same. During the pendency of an action
for dissolution or legal separation, the court has power to award
custody and compel the payment of child support.55 The same
power exists in regard to the final hearing where a dissolution or
legal separation is decreed.5 6 The court's power to determine
custody is to be exercised on the basis of the best interests of the
minor children, including placing the minor children in court cus-
tody if their welfare so requires.57 In the past, some courts have
53. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-360 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
54. This ground for divorce is now recognized in about half of the states.
CLARK, LAw or DorvinsTic RELATIONS § 12.6 (1968).
55. NEB. R.v. STAT. §§ 42-351 and 42-357 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
56. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-351 and 42-364 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
57. By strictly following the "best interest" test where the custody issue
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also used, regardless of the test expressed in the statute, the test
of whether a parent is fit to have custody of a child or children. 58
It has not always been easy to tell in a particular jurisdiction
whether a court deemed the "best interest" and the "fitness" tests
to be synonymous.59 It appears that some courts have treated the
two as synonymous, or resorted to one or the other on an indis-
criminate basis. Perhaps it is worthwhile to undertake a discus-
sion of the two tests here because they are not interchangeable
and can lead to different results.
The "best interest" test is much broader and really subsumes
the "fitness" test, but this does not mean that the "best interest"
test is the appropriate test to be used in all custody matters. As
between two parents, it would appear that the "best interest" test
would always be appropriate and result in a correct solution to
the issue. Where a parent is unfit to have custody of a child, it
follows that it would not be in the best interest of the child to be
placed in the custody of that parent. To this extent, the two tests
coincide and in this situation resort to the "fitness" test need never
occur. In fact, the "fitness" test is of limited usefulness anyway
where the dispute is between two parents, because both parents
are often fit to have custody of the children. Since the "best in-
terest" test is all inclusive where the issue is between two parents,
it should be the exclusive test in that situation.
Where the custody issue is between a parent and a third party,
is between two parents, the opportunity is presented to put to rest
the totally unjustifiable rule that an adulterous wife is unfit as a
matter of law to have custody of her minor children as against the
husband, Wolpa v. Wolpa, 182 Neb. 178, 153 N.W.2d 746 (1967). In
1970 the Nebraska Supreme Court appeared to be on the verge of
abandoning this rule in favor of an appropriate test based primarily on
the best interest of the children, see Fisher v. Fisher, 185 Neb. 469,
179 N.W.2d 667 (1970), but the rule still stands. That the Wolpa
rule serves only to punish and is totally foreign to the merits of the
issue is born out by such cases as Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb. 198, 120
N.W.2d 585 (1963); Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d
861 (1965); Hanson v. Hanson, 187 Neb. 108, 187 N.W.2d 647 (1971);
and Nemecek v. Nemecek, 188 Neb. 799, 199 N.W.2d 409 (1972), where,
under various circumstances, an adulterous wife or permissive ex-wife
is given, or allowed to keep, physical custody of her minor children
while legal custody or supervisory power is given to the appropriatejuvenile probation officer.
58. See, e.g., Gorsuch v. Gorsuch, 143 Neb. 578, 578-79, 11 N.W.2d 456,
456 (1943): "The proper rule in a divorce case, where the custody of
minor children is involved, is that the custody of the child is to be
determined by the best interests of the child, with due regard for the
superior rights of fit, proper, and suitable parents."
59. Compare, e.g., Mandelstam v. Mandelstam, 458 S.W.2d 786 (Ky.
1970), with James v. James, 457 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1970).
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such as a grandparent, other relative or public agency, it is sub-
mitted that "fitness" of the parent is the only appropriate test.
In this situation the "best interest" test may lead to undesirable re-
sults if followed literally. It is possible for a parent to be mini-
mally fit as far as custody is concerned, while the best interest of
a child requires that custody be placed in a third party because
of the advantages which might be bestowed upon a child by that
person. 60 It is not uncommon to have a situation where, because
of the economic and cultural conditions of the parent, over which
the parent may have little or no control, the circumstances dictate
that a child be placed with a third party under a "best interest"
test. Parents are the natural guardians of their minor chil-
dren and are given much discretion and leeway in the rearing
of their children in our society. This is true even though other
parents or agencies might tend to do better, and the child or chil-
dren in question might fare better if they were removed from the
custody of their natural parents. This, however, is a practice that
we have yet to indulge in our society and probably never will as
long as it raises the specter that has occurred in certain countries
within the memory of many now living. As long as the natural
parent passes the minimum test of fitness, the court should not
be compelled to decide what the best interests of the child dictate
when the issue is between a parent and a third party. That has
already been given due consideration under the "fitness" test.
Lastly, as has always been the law, the court retains jurisdiction
to modify child custody and support awards, after notice 6 1 and
hearing, until such time as a child reaches majority.
60. For a good example of the type of difficulty that a court could avoid
by using the "fitness" test where the custody issue is between a
parent and a third party or parties, see Painter v. Bannister, 258
Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966), where the court, even though ad-
mitting the father was fit, decided that the "stable, dependable, con-
ventional, middle class, middlewest background" of the maternal
grandparents should win out over the more "Bohemian" approach
to life of the father in resolving what is in the best interest of the
child.
61. The new act does not, nor did former § 42-312 dealing with modifi-
cation, specify the nature or kind of notice required on a motion to
modify. In Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890, 46 N.W.2d 618 (1951),
personal service was perfected on a former husband, then domi-
ciled in Texas, on a motion to modify child support, and the Supreme
Court upheld the service under former § 42-312: "In a proceeding to
modify a divorce decree under statutory provision authorizing sub-
sequent changes in the divorce decree, 'due process of law' requires
only that the method of service be reasonably calculated to give the
person served knowledge of the proceedings and opportunity to be
heard." Id. at 900, 46 N.W.2d at 624. Thus, one type of service
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VII. ALIMONY
Upon dissolution of a marriage the court may order payments of
alimony by one party to the other.6 2 Notably, the language does
not restrict alimony to payments by the husband to a wife. The
alimony must be reasonable, having regard for the circumstances
of the parties, the duration of the marriage, and the ability of the
supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfer-
ing with the interests of any minor children in the custody of such
party. As under the old law, reasonable security may be required
by the court.6 3 The new law makes no change in the distinction be-
tween lump sum, or alimony in gross, and periodic alimony pay-
ments. The former is treated as a debt and is not subsequently
modifiable except by agreement of the parties.64 Periodic alimony
payments are modifiable upon a showing of change of circum-
stances, except for those installment payments which accrued prior
to service of notice65 of the modification hearing. Accrued install-
ments are not modifiable.
The new act also expressly provides that unless the parties
agree in writing, or the order of the court provides otherwise, the
obligation to pay periodic alimony "shall" terminate upon the
death of either party or upon the remarriage of the recipient. 66
The use of the word "shall" probably works a slight change in
Nebraska law. In Wolter v. Wolter 67 the Supreme Court of Ne-
which would have been insufficient for an original order for child
support is sufficient to modify an original order obtained under in
personam jurisdiction. Even though courts justify the above type of
service on the idea that the original jurisdiction continues, it is very
doubtful that citation by publication would be upheld where the
modification of monetary payments is concerned.
62. NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1972). Under § 42-359, a claim
for alimony must be accompanied by a sworn statement in regard to
the applicant's financial condition. The court may order the person
against whom the claim is made to do likewise in response to the
claim.
63. Section 42-371 covers liens securing judgments and orders for the pay-
ment of money under the new divorce act.
64. "'An unqualified allowance of alimony in gross, whether payable
immediately in full or periodically in installments, and whether in-
tended solely as a property settlement or an allowance for support,
or both, is such a definite and final adjustment of mutual rights and
obligations between husband and wife as to be capable of a present
vesting and to constitute an absolute judgment, and survives the
death of the husband.' Spencer v. Spencer, 165 Neb. 675, 87 N.W.2d
212. Such an allowance is not subject to modification." Ball v.
Ball, 183 Neb. 216, 219, 159 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1968).
65. For the type of notice required, see note 61, supra.
66. See the last sentence of § 42-365.
67. 183 Neb. 160, 158 N.W.2d 616 (1968).
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braska held that the remarriage of the alimony recipient did not
automatically, in and of itself, terminate the right to receive peri-
odic alimony payments. It merely established a prima facie case
which required the court to terminate it in the absence of proof of
some extraordinary circumstances justifying its continuation. 8
Even though a motion to modify might still be required, it will be
a technicality because the court has no choice under the new lan-
guage but to terminate the obligation to pay periodic alimony upon
remarriage of the recipient. Of course, remarriage of the person
paying periodic alimony is not sufficient by itself for modifica-
tion.69
A new provision is contained in the new act stating that "where
alimony is not allowed in the original decree dissolving a mar-
riage, such decree may not be modified to award alimony. °7 0 This
provision appears innocuous on its face, but could be a trap for
the unwary. Because of the situation where a court has the power
to grant an ex parte divorce by virtue of its jurisdiction over the
petitioning party,71 a person who is entitled to alimony could lose
a very valuable right without an opportunity to be heard if this
provision is interpreted to apply to all cases where the decree does
not contain an award of alimony.
Injustice would result, for example, where a suit for dissolution
of a marriage is brought in Nebraska by a resident and the other
spouse has already established a residence in another state. The
Nebraska court, not having the power to perfect in personam ju-
risdiction where the respondent is a resident of another state,
would be powerless to award alimony to the wife. 2 As a matter
68. One of the extraordinary circumstances concerning the court involves
the situation where the validity of the second marriage is in issue.
This is a part of a larger problem involving the effect of an invalid
second marriage upon the right to receive and the obligation to pay
alimony arising from a prior marriage. This problem still exists under
the new language of § 42-365: "Except as otherwise agreed by the
parties in writing or by order of the court, alimony orders shall termi-
nate upon .. .the remarriage of the recipient." Certainly where the
issue is raised at the time of an attempt to terminate alimony pay-
ments, the court should only be bound to terminate where there is a
valid "remarriage." For a discussion of the problems involved in the
question of whether an annulment of a second marriage revives the
obligation to pay alimony from a prior marriage, see CLARK, LAW OF
DoMEsTc RELATIONS § 3.6 (1968).
69. McIlwain v. Mc~lwain, 135 Neb. 705, 283 N.W. 845 (1939).
70. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
71. See discussion in text at note 4 supra.
72. See discussion in text at note 28 supra. But see Stuckey v. Stuckey,
note 6 supra.
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of justice the statute should not be so construed, and moreover,
such an interpretation might cause the provision to be held un-
constitutional. 73 A construction should be placed upon the statute
so that it will not run afoul of the constitution and so that injustice
will not take place under it. This can be done by limiting the pro-
vision to those situations where the court has in personam juris-
diction over both parties.
VII. PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
The new law expressly provides for property settlements be-
tween parties to a marriage attendant upon their separation or
the dissolution of the marriage.74 Case law in Nebraska pertaining
to property settlements under the law prior to the new act re-
quires that the parties actually separate and that grounds for di-
vorce exist at the time such an agreement is executed.75 One
should expect this rule to continue under the new act particularly
in regard to the requirement of an actual separation, even though
there is now only one ground for dissolution or legal separation
and that being somewhat amorphous. The purpose of the require-
ment is to proscribe property settlements where such an agree-
ment might lead or be conducive to a divorce or separation, while
73. Even though there would be no "full faith and credit" problem where
the petitioning spouse is barred from seeking alimony from the re-
spondent spouse in another jurisdiction because that jurisdiction
would only be giving the same effect to the decree as Nebraska
would, a serious argument could be waged that the right to alimony
was denied without due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. See Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). One
of the ways the petitioning spouse could attempt to avoid the prob-
lem of losing the right to alimony in some situations would be to en-
yoke the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, NEB.
REv. STAT. § 42-762 to 7,104 (Cum. Supp. 1972) by having the court
find and certify that the respondent spouse was obliged to pay ali-
mony and include an amount in the decree, to be modified, if neces-
sary, upon hearing in the responding state. For a discussion of the
question whether a former spouse can obtain alimony subsequent
to a divorce where the decree does not mention alimony, see CLAKa,
LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATioNs § 14.4 (1968).
74. NFB. REV. STAT. § 42-366 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
75. Chambers v. Chambers, 155 Neb. 160, 51 N.W.2d 310 (1952); In re
Estate of Lauderback, 106 Neb. 461, 184 N.W. 128 (1921). NEn. REV.
STAT. § 30-106 (Cum. Supp. 1972) provides an exception to this rule
by authorizing ante-nuptial and certain post-nuptial property settle-
ment agreements in regard to real property where the agreement is
in writing, signed by both spouses, and "acknowledged in the manner
required by law for the conveyance of real estate, or executed in
conformity with the laws of the place where made."
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providing a means of avoiding controversy and litigation where
the marriage is actually at an end.7 6
The terms of a property settlement agreement, which may in-
clude provisions for "maintenance,"7 7 are binding upon the court
unless found to be unconscionable.7 8  Thus, the power to prohibit
subsequent modifications by the court could, broadly construed,
preclude court modification of periodic, as well as lump sum, ali-
mony payments to which the parties have agreed if the agreement
is not unconscionable at the time of execution. The parties by
agreement could thereby oust the court of its traditional continu-
ing jurisdiction over periodic alimony. Whether such a construc-
tion will be given remains to be seen,7 9 but that such a power
should exist in the parties, under court supervision, would not be
unprecedented.80 It would, after all, be a two edge sword; the
amount could neither be reduced nor increased.
In regard to the enforcement of the terms of a settlement agree-
ment, a distinction appears to be made between an agreement, the
terms of which are set forth in the decree of the court dissolving
a marriage or granting a legal separation, and a settlement agree-
ment which is merely identified in such a decree without setting
forth any of the specific terms of the agreement. Section 42-366(5)
provides that "terms of the agreement set forth in the decree" may
be enforced by all remedies available for the enforcement of a
judgment, including contempt. Thus, the mere identification and
approval of a settlement agreement, and even adoption of the terms
by reference in a divorce decree, would mean, under a literal in-
terpretation of section 42-366(5), that one must consult general
contract law for their remedy.8 ' This would mean that the con-
76. See In re Estate of Lauderback, note 75 supra.
77. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-366(1) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
78. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-366(2) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
79. When subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 42-366 are read in conjunction
with subdivision (6), the statute might also be construed to mean that
the parties are bound to their agreement by contract law, with the
remedies available thereunder, but that the court still has the power
to award alimony where necessary. For instance, where the obligated
spouse is judgment proof and satisfaction of the property settlement
agreement is not possible under ordinary remedies, a court could
"get blood out of a turnip" by awarding alimony and enforcing its
order through the contempt power. Cf. McMains v. McMains, 15
N.Y.2d 283, 206 N.E.2d 185, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1965). This assumes that
the identification and approval of the agreement in the decree would
suffice as an allowance of alimony so as not to be barred by NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
80. For example, see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Supp. 1972).
81. See CLARK, LAW OF Doim~sic RELATIONS § 16.12 (1968).
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tempt power would not be available in that situation to enforce
the terms of the agreement.8 2 Thus, to ensure the full array of
remedies, one should set out the terms of the settlement agreement
in the decree and have the court order their performance.
IX. CONCLUSION
As far as the bench and bar are concerned, the new act should
provide a more streamlined and efficient procedure for dissolving
those marital unions in Nebraska which exist in name only. The
adversary nature of the prior law was not indispensable and was
probably really never appropriate for this type of proceeding.
When a personal relationship with another under the institution
of marriage has deteriorated to the point that the parties can no
longer live together and provide our society with the sort of stable
socio-economic unit on which this country so depends, it is time to
call a spade a spade and dissolve it without acrimony, moral judg-
ments or benedictions. The Nebraska Legislature is to be com-
mended for dealing forthrightly with an old and vexing problem.
82. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 20 provides: "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt in any civil action on mesne or final process, unless in cases of
fraud." Alimony, where awarded by the court, is not a debt under
this provision, Jensen v. Jensen, 119 Neb. 469, 229 N.W. 770 (1930),
but the obligation underlying a mere agreement between the parties to
pay alimony could be so construed. For cases holding that where
there is no incorporation the contempt power does not lie, see Bradley
v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957); Young v. Su-
perior Court, 105 Cal. App. 2d 65, 233 P.2d 39 (1951); Shogren v. Su-
perior Court, 93 Cal. App. 2d 356, 209 P.2d 108 (1949); Campbell v.
Goodbar, 110 Colo. 403, 134 P.2d 1060 (1943).
